

BUCHBESPRECHUNGEN

CHINA'S CHANGING ATTITUDES TOWARD THE OVERSEAS CHINESE

Review Article

By MARY F. SOMERS HEIDHUES

In *China and the Overseas Chinese, a Study of Peking's Changing Policy, 1949—1970* (Cambridge University Press, 1972), Stephen FitzGerald provides an excellent analysis of the attitudes of the People's Republic of China toward persons of Chinese origin residing abroad. The problem of the Overseas Chinese as an issue in international politics is one of the 20th century, but, although it attracted much attention of scholars since the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949, the question did not emerge full-blown at that time. In fact, its roots go quite far back in Chinese history.

Historically, the Chinese Empire went through periods of outward orientation as well as those of comparative isolation, periods when trade and contact with Southeast Asia and other neighboring areas flourished. This trade was cloaked in the form of official "tribute missions" (for imperial China, international dealings did not take place on the basis of equality) which made their way from Southeast Asia to the Court, exchanging their produce for Chinese goods and confirming, in China's eyes, the Celestial Empire's hegemony over the southern regions. In addition, Chinese junks, most of them based on the coast of southeastern China, continued the centuries-old practice of private trade with Southeast Asia, albeit not always with official sanction.

Understandably, settlement became a corollary of trade. Grouped near the harbors were small communities of Chinese who resided for extended periods in Southeast Asia, perhaps even permanently, taking wives from the local population. When Europeans came to Southeast Asia's ports at the turn of the 16th century, the Chinese were already there¹.

The accession to power of the Manchus or Ch'ing in 1644 and the consequent shift of the Empire's power center inland and to the north contributed to a changed attitude toward trade and travel of Chinese. Some last opponents of the Manchus had taken refuge in the south or fled to Southeast Asia. In 1661, the rebel and pirate Koxinga drove the Dutch from Formosa, making it his base for raids on the mainland and on the Philippines, and only in 1683 did the Ch'ing reestablish central control over the island². The Emperor branded seagoing traders as brigands, rebels and adventurers, and held up the Confucian principle, filial piety, to migrants: those who traveled far from home risked leaving their parents alone in old age and without heirs to honor their memory. Ch'ing law also prescribed severe penalties, even death, for migrants on their return, although occasionally amnesties were offered and, at other times, the law could be evaded for a price³.

1 On the early Chinese settlements in the Netherlands Indies, see Mary F. Somers Heidhues, "Dutch Colonial and Indonesian Nationalist Policies toward the Chinese Minority in Indonesia, *Verfassung und Recht in Übersee*, 3, 1972, pp. 251—253.

2 On Koxinga, as Westerners called Cheng Ch'eng-kung, see A. W. Hummel, ed., *Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing Period* (Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1943), pp. 108—110.

3 Ch'ing policy on migration is related in Harley F. MacNair, *The Chinese Abroad: their Position and Protection* (Shanghai, The Commercial Press, 1925).

Understandably, perhaps, the effect of all these sanctions was not great. Ties between Southeast Asia and southeastern China continued to exist. Chinese settlements in Southeast Asia remained and were replenished with new immigrants. By the late 19th century, the Empire recognized that it was fighting a losing battle. The existence of foreign concessions and of Hong Kong permitted Chinese to slip out of the country uncontrollably. Demand for unskilled, cheap Chinese labor in North and South America and for European enterprises, especially mines and plantations, in Southeast Asia rose astronomically after about 1870. War and natural catastrophes, especially in the densely populated areas of southeastern China, left millions destitute. Chinese emigration changed in the late 19th century in both quantity and quality; those leaving now numbered in the hundreds of thousands each year, and, for the most part, they came from the unskilled rural poor and were not traders or artisans as were their predecessors.

Three factors probably influenced the Chinese court to change its policy, however belatedly, on emigration. One was China's entry into international diplomacy: the era of tribute missions from foreign barbarians was over, and foreign powers demanded that China recognize the right of her people to emigrate. Second, some Chinese officials hoped to regulate the appalling conditions under which coolies were recruited and transported. Finally, a few enlightened officials such as Chang Chih-tung⁴ planned to ask wealthy Overseas Chinese merchants to support development projects in the homeland and to aid in spreading a Confucian renaissance⁵.

China finally signed agreements with France, Britain and the USA recognizing the right of emigration and regulating the conditions of coolie labor traffic. In 1877 a Chinese consul was posted in Singapore and in 1898 in Manila.

In 1909, the Ch'ing law code defined a Chinese as anyone born of a Chinese father (or mother, if the father was unknown), no matter what his birthplace. This strict application of *jus sanguinis* is hardly surprising in the context of the time. Virtually all foreigners in China were then covered by extraterritoriality; *jus soli* was not recognized within or without the Empire. Nevertheless, we may suppose that the Empire expected to profit from such a broad interpretation of Chinese nationality.

The Nationalist Government

Meanwhile, the nationalist revolutionary Sun Yat-sen was making a concerted effort to tap the financial and political resources of the Chinese abroad. Sun's peculiar life history predisposed him to turn to the Overseas Chinese. His family had members abroad and he himself spent part of his youth with a brother in Hawaii. He lived much of his adult life in exile and had to recruit revolutionary support outside China. Among Chinese abroad, certain secret societies flourished which, in addition to their religious and economic purposes, in China had a record of opposition to the Manchus. Western influence, on the other hand, may have

⁴ Chang Chih-tung, late Ch'ing Dynasty official and reformer, Governor-General of Kwangtung and Kwangsi provinces (Kwangtung is one of the two home provinces of the Overseas Chinese; the other is Fukien) from 1884 to 1889. For his interest in Overseas Chinese investments, see Edgar Wickberg, *The Chinese in Philippine Life, 1850—1898*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965).

made a few Overseas Chinese more receptive to Sun's ideas of democracy and nationalism⁵. Later, when Sun lost power in the north of China, he attempted to rebuild his forces in Canton, the home area of so many emigrant Chinese.

After Sun's death and the Northern Expedition to consolidate Kuomintang power, the KMT continued the policy of cultivating the Overseas Chinese on several fronts. First, the Nationalist government attempted to attract investments or philanthropic grants, especially for schools and hospitals, from Overseas Chinese. In addition to these donations, individual Overseas Chinese remitting money to their families provided substantial amounts of foreign exchange⁶.

The Kuomintang also continued the Empire's claim of *jus sanguinis* in its nationality law of 1929: Chinese born abroad remained Chinese and could divest themselves of Chinese nationality only by petitioning the Ministry of Interior. When it is recalled that most Overseas Chinese lived in colonial Southeast Asia and that the alternative to Chinese nationality would have been status as British, French or Dutch subjects, it is not surprising that few — if any — attempted to become non-Chinese.

The political structure of the Nationalist government and party also reflected the interest in Overseas Chinese. The KMT maintained an Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission and, after 1932, an Overseas Party Affairs Department⁷. The government also provided for representation of Chinese abroad in its representative bodies.

In addition, the Kuomintang maintained party branches or study clubs in towns and cities abroad. In Singapore, where the party had built its earliest organization through the secret societies, the KMT continued certain illegal activities of these brotherhoods and the British authorities finally outlawed the party in 1930. In Java, the party was known to include so-called Lion Clubs, which were believed to be communist cells, particularly in view of the KMT-Chinese Communist Party alliance in effect from 1924 to 1927 and in the 1930's⁸.

The most significant areas of political and ideological influence on Overseas Chinese were the Chinese-language schools and press. The movement for modern Chinese-language education in Chinese communities abroad goes back to the turn of this century, but the KMT government made a concerted effort to exert its authority over the schools, prescribing curricula and even sending abroad inspectors of education. In any event, China was the only source for textbooks, and virtually the only one for teachers, so the possibility of influencing the schools politically was great.

As for the press, a number of Chinese-language newspapers in Southeast Asia and elsewhere supported the Kuomintang, although they were not directly owned by the party.

5 The standard biography of Sun remains Lyon Sharman, *Sun Yat-sen: His Life and its Meaning* (New York, 1934); much new material, particularly with reference to Sun's overseas activities, appears in Harold Z. Schiffrin, *Sun Yat-sen and the Origins of the Chinese Revolution* (Berkeley and Los Angeles University of California Press, 1968).

6 Chin-hsi Wu cites figures of from 242 to 479 million Chinese dollars annual remittances between 1934 and 1938. In many years, the remittances offset a substantial trade deficit. *Dollars, Dependents and Dogma: Overseas Chinese Remittances to Communist China* (Stanford: The Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, 1967), p. 16.

7 Yoji Akashi, *The Nanyang Chinese National Salvation Movement, 1937—1941* (Center for East Asian Studies, University of Kansas, 1970), pp. 3—6.

8 M. F. W. Treub, *Het gis in Indië* (Haarlem: Tjeenk Willink, 1927). Some colonial officials suspected the Chinese of aiding Indonesian communists and nationalists, but they probably exaggerated the importance of these contacts.

Although it had always sought overseas investments and remittances, the KMT turned to the Chinese abroad for direct support after the Japanese attacks on China in 1937. Overseas Chinese were urged to put pressure on Japan by boycotting Japanese goods, for example, and a vast campaign to aid China was organized, even in those colonies where the European powers were worried about the effects of such campaigns on their relations with Japan⁹.

The years 1942—45, during which Japan occupied nearly all of Southeast Asia, brought a hiatus in the relations between Overseas Chinese and the motherland. At the end of the war, the KMT attempted to pick up where it had left off among the Chinese abroad, but it faced a changed situation.

War's end left the Overseas Chinese communities highly politicized. During the Japanese period, particularly in Malaya and Indonesia, relations with the indigenous peoples had deteriorated badly. The colonial powers, having shown their weakness at the time of the Japanese advance, were in no position to defend the Chinese minorities, for they themselves faced independence movements led by militant nationalists. As a result, Chinese minorities abroad developed high expectations of what China, now a great power and one of the "Big Five" in the United Nations, could do to protect their interests. China's plunge into civil war came for most as an unexpected shock.

Until 1945, the Chinese Communist Party enjoyed limited influence among Overseas Chinese populations. Unlike the Kuomintang, whose history and membership had been concentrated in south China, especially in Overseas Chinese home provinces, the CCP had been virtually bottled up in the isolated northern province of Shensi and other scattered enclaves, cut off from outside contact. Outside funds and remittances played little role in its budget, nor were its members disproportionately southerners, as were those of the Kuomintang¹⁰. Small cores of communist sympathizers, particularly among labor unions, remained from the organizing efforts of the 1920's and 1930's in Southeast Asia, and an even smaller group of intellectuals (including, ironically, many Westernized intellectuals¹¹) expressed enthusiasm for New China. A few wealthy Overseas Chinese managed to visit the communist controlled Liberated Areas during the Civil war and to bring the message home. Malaya, of course, was to witness an armed struggle against the British, led and manned by Overseas Chinese communists, whose links with the Mainland have, however, never been proved to be decisive. Even the Malayan Chinese communists, however represented only a small fraction of Malaya's Chinese community.

The decisive elements in the struggle between KMT and the People's Republic of China for political influence in Overseas Chinese communities after 1949 were Peking's success in establishing itself as the *de facto* government of China, the attitudes of the host Southeast Asian governments to recognition of the People's Republic, and the transition from colonial to nationalist policies. This transition

⁹ See Yoji Akashi, *op. cit.* The Thai government, which pursued a policy sympathetic to Japan, obstructed Chinese participation in the movement in Thailand.

¹⁰ Robert C. North, *Kuomintang and Chinese Communist Elites* (Stanford) Stanford University Press, 1952 contrasts the geographic origins of KMT and Communist leaders.

¹¹ For example, Edgar Snow's *Red Star over China* was published in Indonesian translation in a Surabaya newspaper owned by Dutch-educated persons of Chinese origin in 1938 (until the censors intervened). See Mary F. Somers, *Peranakan Chinese Politics in Indonesia* (Ph. D. Thesis, Cornell University, 1965), p. 100.

brought with it efforts to integrate Chinese minorities into the new nations, restricting the possibilities of the Chinese government to influence or manipulate Chinese minorities abroad.

Early Policies of the People's Republic of China

Any analysis of the political activities of Chinese abroad is faced with the difficulty of separating locally generated factors from conscious mainland policies intended to manipulate the Overseas Chinese. Here, FitzGerald's China and the Overseas Chinese is a valuable and in some respects unique attempt to identify and isolate the deliberate decisions of the People's Republic of China on Overseas Chinese policy since its assumption of power in 1949.

From that date until sometime in 1954, the Peking government continued the Overseas Chinese policy of its predecessor. The organization of Overseas Chinese affairs resembled that of the KMT. The People's Republic established an Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission, consisting of a committee appointed by the State Council and an administrative bureaucracy with branches at the county or even township level in certain home areas of the Overseas Chinese. The Commission worked closely with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In addition, thirty deputies "represent" the Overseas Chinese in the National People's Congress. These thirty are all residents of China; there are no elections among Chinese communities abroad.

Finally, there is the non-governmental organization, the All-China Returned Overseas Chinese Association, also with branches at the local level in areas where returned Overseas Chinese or dependents of Overseas Chinese reside. Despite the connection with the Foreign Ministry, it is significant that these organizations have been primarily concerned with what FitzGerald calls "domestic Overseas Chinese", families of Chinese abroad, returned Overseas Chinese, and Overseas Chinese students. Since remittances to such persons constituted an important source of foreign exchange for Chinese governments, FitzGerald is certainly justified in regarding policy toward domestic Overseas Chinese as a keystone of Overseas Chinese policy.

In fact, the 1949—1954 policy of Peking pursued two not necessarily reconcilable goals. On the one hand, Chinese living abroad were encouraged to regard themselves as Chinese nationals and to expect China to intercede to protect their rights and interests. Its sympathizers were engaged in a struggle for control of the schools, organizations and press in Chinese communities abroad, and all Chinese abroad were urged to reject the pretensions of the Kuomintang to represent the motherland. At the same time, domestic Overseas Chinese were to be integrated into New China, foregoing the privileges which their wealth or their remittances enabled them to buy. Both policy aspects proved counterproductive. The former aroused expectations which Peking, having only limited diplomatic representation (and no gunboats) in Southeast Asia, could not fulfill; while the latter discouraged remittances and investments from abroad, reducing the amount of foreign exchange accruing to the government. Peking determined to re-evaluate its policy toward the Overseas Chinese.

FitzGerald identifies a further cause for the rethinking of Overseas Chinese policy, the failure of the Malayan Communist insurgency of 1948—1960, primarily, as China soon perceived, because it was a communally based, Chinese insurrection. By 1951, and, if FitzGerald is to be believed, even earlier, it was clear that the Malayan communists not only could not win, but that, by their policy of indiscriminate terrorism and isolation from the Malay population, they were victimizing and alienating the Chinese minority. Peking may have favored the “export” of revolution in that it urged colonial and semicolonial countries to follow China’s example in throwing off the yoke of oppression. But clearly, if even Malaya’s Chinese, who were nearly 40 % of the population, could not successfully wage revolution against the relatively easy target of British colonial rule, then the Chinese minorities in other Southeast Asian countries, most of which were formally independent and where the Chinese minority was less than 10 % of the population, could not do so either. Using Overseas Chinese to spread communism in Southeast Asia was fraught with danger for the Overseas Chinese and risked failure for the communist movement. Peking quickly and decisively abandoned the idea that Overseas Chinese could be used, as a group, as a Fifth Column in Southeast Asia.

China’s new policy, Fitzgerald subsumes under the term “decolonization”, analogous to the imperial powers’ acquiescence in the independence of their colonial territories. While the settlements of Chinese abroad were not true “colonies” of China, nevertheless, partly under the pressure of Southeast Asian nationalism and suspicion of the Overseas Chinese and of China, Peking consciously decided, in or about 1954, to divest itself of the embarrassment of the Overseas Chinese, first, by doing away with dual nationality. In this and in the subsequent stage of decolonization, the motto prevailed, “Overseas Chinese policy shall be subordinate to foreign policy”.

In 1954 and 1955, for example, Chou En-lai offered to conclude treaties with the countries of residence of Overseas Chinese which would settle the issue of dual nationality. FitzGerald accepts the assertion that this was not only a matter of abandoning *jus sanguinis* but also one of winning diplomatic recognition of Peking in such lands as Thailand and the Philippines (which maintained relations with Nationalist China).

The offer, however, brought forth a response only from Indonesia, and the course of that treaty was not satisfactory to either party¹². By the end of 1957, the second stage of decolonization had begun. In the previous year, Chou had stated that Chinese abroad would not be recognized as Chinese nationals if they “freely” acquired another nationality¹³. These persons of Chinese origin and Southeast Asian citizenship were expected to become one with the local people-

12 FitzGerald draws here on Donald E. Willmott, *The National Status of the Chinese in Indonesia* (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1961). After relations between Peking and Jakarta were

13 In 1957, China protested against South Vietnamese citizenship regulations which made all local-born persons of Chinese origin Vietnamese nationals. China said they should be allowed to choose between Chinese and Vietnamese citizenship. Either this is a case of application of *jus sanguinis*, as in the KMT nationality law, or China’s position was colored by her relation to the Diem government — an interpretation which FitzGerald goes to some lengths to deny. Reports of the negotiations with Malaysia on diplomatic recognition of the People’s Republic of China confirm that Peking makes no claims on the citizenship of those persons of Chinese descent who have Malaysian citizenship. A stumbling block, however, remains in the presence of some 200,000 persons who have not acquired Malaysian citizenship and whom Peking “is reluctant to renounce”. Stephen Chee, “Malaysia and Singapore: the Political Economy of Multiracial Development”, *Asian Survey*, February 1974, p. 188. suspended, Indonesia unilaterally abrogated the treaty in 1968.

Chou used every indication, without using the word itself, that China wanted them to become "assimilated". Those who retained Chinese citizenship and remained abroad were to abstain from all political activity.

The way in which Overseas Chinese policy was subordinated to domestic policy confirms this interpretation. If Chou's statements on nationality demonstrated that Peking was not interested in utilizing the Chinese abroad as a Fifth Column, the government was still interested in protecting them as a source of foreign exchange. In the mid-1950's, Overseas Chinese students were freely admitted to China for study, private investments were encouraged and protected (including the right to repatriate profits), and persons receiving remittances from abroad could use them to purchase goods or privileges not available to those without such connections. Returns on the liberal investment policy, however, hardly justified the effort of maintaining special organizations to administer it. Furthermore, domestic Overseas Chinese were becoming a class apart. As foreign exchange earnings from remittances dropped, the regime had to decide whether to continue coddling this special group or to try to integrate them as rapidly as possible in Chinese village and urban society. The policy of integration and no special treatment prevailed from 1957 until 1960, when the numbers of returning Overseas Chinese suddenly jumped.

In 1958, the mainland Overseas Chinese bureaucracy announced its intent to welcome back those Overseas Chinese who did not wish to acquire the citizenship of the land where they resided. The test of the new policy came in 1959—60, when nearly 100,000 persons of Chinese origin left Indonesia as a result of the ban on retail trade by aliens in rural areas. Overseas Chinese, however, proved ill-suited to resettlement in New China. The homeland disappointed the high expectations of young returnees (nearly one-third of the total¹⁴), who hoped to continue their schooling, while the older persons and families who returned were expected to develop new areas for tropical or subtropical farming. These persons, the great majority of whom were traders, artisans or laborers, and most of whom were from cities or small towns, proved unable to cope with the rigors of rural pioneering. The Open Door for returnees was quietly shut.

The Cultural Revolution and Overseas Chinese Policy

FitzGerald's central argument that Peking has permanently abandoned any intention of using Overseas Chinese to interfere in internal Southeast Asian affairs rests above all on the crucial assumption that the incidents involving China and Overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia during the Cultural Revolution represented an aberration and not a change in policy as such.

The Summer of 1967 witnessed incidents in Burma and Cambodia involving Overseas Chinese and interference by members of the Chinese embassies in domestic affairs. In Burma, the incidents of June—July resulted in anti-Chinese riots, a number of deaths, and the suspension of diplomatic relations between the two countries. Young Overseas Chinese had provoked Burmese reaction by demon-

¹⁴ This estimate is based on analysis of the figures in the mainland press about returnees: about one-third were high school or college students. See Somers, *op. cit.*, p. 209. This was a small fraction of Indonesia's Chinese minority.

strating for Mao, wearing Mao badges (which were distributed by the Chinese Embassy in Rangoon), but the Burmese government, usually interested in maintaining good relations with China, seems in this case to have condoned a harsh anti-Chinese reaction. Although Cambodia and China also approached a break in diplomatic relations in August of that year, not least because of the Maoist political demonstrations of young Overseas Chinese (which Chou En-lai is reported to have defended¹⁵), Prince Sihanouk was able finally to avoid a break with Peking, while at the same time curbing internal political influence from Peking¹⁶.

FitzGerald makes the following assertions about these incidents: first, the Peking Foreign Ministry itself was paralyzed at this time and unable to assert its authority over the radicals, whose leaders besieged and captured the ministry, even sending out unauthorized telegrams and directives to representatives abroad. Second, when the ministry was "normalized", Peking virtually repudiated the radicals' disruptions of relations with Cambodia and later restored those with Burma. Finally the Overseas Chinese bureaucracy in China was occupied by extremists in 1967, and leaders Fang Fang and Liao Ch'eng-chih left the scene after being attacked by Red Guards for their policy of "abandoning" the Overseas Chinese. Although Liao Ch'eng-chih has reappeared in public since FitzGerald's account was closed, the Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission is, according to a statement from Chou En-lai to Burma's Prime Minister Ne Win in August 1971, "no longer needed and has been dissolved", with its responsibilities taken over by the Consular Department of the Foreign Ministry¹⁷.

Peking and the Southeast Asian Context

In view of the above careful and convincing arguments, how can the image of the Chinese abroad as a Fifth Column have persisted for almost 20 years after it was decisively abandoned by Peking? Although FitzGerald offers little speculation on this theme, some explanation is appropriate here.

First, suspicion of China and Chinese on the part of Southeast Asians, and of certain scholars from outside the region, based more on prejudice than on provocation by the Chinese, has fed the theory of the Fifth Column. Southeast Asian nationalism has harbored distinct anti-Chinese elements, and Westerners have adapted their distrust of Chinese to their Cold War image of Peking.

Some observers have further expected that Peking necessarily continue the foreign policy and attitude of the Kuomintang, including its nationality law. Here Peking is partly to blame. According to FitzGerald, the People's Republic of China declared invalid all laws of the Nationalist government, including, presumably, that on nationality. While Peking has now also repudiated the KMT policy on

15 Chou is reported to have told an envoy of Prince Sihanouk that Overseas Chinese in Cambodia had a right to display their love for China, Chairman Mao, and the Cultural Revolution. If this is true it is a reversal of Chou's position in the late 1950's Cited from a Cambodian Ministry of Information bulletin about Sihanouk in Melvin Gurtov, *China and Southeast Asia: the Politics of Survival* (Lexington: D. C. Heath and Company, 1971), p. 120.

16 Sihanouk banned distribution of the mainland's New China News Agency (Hsinhua) bulletins and cracked down on other domestic activities of Mao-enthusiasts. Gurtov, *op. cit.*, pp. 120-123.

17 FitzGerald, who visited China in February 1968 and spoke with an official of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission expresses doubt that the Commission is still in existence, since it is not mentioned in the press after late 1968. Chou's comment on the dissolution of the commission appears in "Restructuring of Bureaucracy Nearly Complete", *Current Scene*, July 1972, p. 13. Liao Ch'eng-chih has found a new mission in promoting good relations with Japan. FitzGerald is now Australia's Ambassador to China.

Overseas Chinese, and its own policy of the first five years, this has not been as absolutely consistent as FitzGerald presents it. In practice, the PRC has acted on *jus sanguinis* and allowed persons of Chinese descent born abroad a residual claim to Chinese citizenship¹⁸.

A final element has been provocations by certain Overseas Chinese themselves, whether or not they are directed or even supported by Peking. Here, FitzGerald's analysis warrants balancing against experiences in Southeast Asia itself. As he admits, there remains in Southeast Asia a hard core of persons of Chinese descent who are unwilling, or, because of obstruction from local laws or bureaucrats, unable, to acquire the citizenship of the countries where they reside. The numbers of such persons able to return to China has not been great, as the events of 1960 prove. Many of these persons live in a Chinese-language, culturally Chinese environment in which their attachment to the homeland is constantly reinforced. Chinese-language schools are known to have fostered political and cultural chauvinism among young Overseas Chinese, for example in Singapore in the 1950's and in the above-mentioned cases of Burma and Cambodia. Although these schools are controlled or even completely abolished in Southeast Asia at present, the sentiments of the young people involved are harder to control. Isolation from all cultural and political influences from China is simply not possible, nor can anyone legislate their detachment from the homeland. For these and other reasons indigenous to Southeast Asia and beyond even Peking's control, they are susceptible to "leftist" or "Maoist" politics. These young Overseas Chinese of Chinese cultural loyalty, by far a minority of persons of Chinese descent in Southeast Asia, cannot be manipulated at will by Peking, but they may be compared to tinder, which, given the right conditions, may be ignited by a stray spark. With reference to revolutionary potential in Southeast Asian countries, however, as Peking has long recognized, they are too small and isolated a group to be capable of setting off the proverbial Prairie Fire.

NEUE BÜCHER ZUR ZAMBISCHEN WIRTSCHAFT

Von HINRICH SCHROEDER-HOHENWARTH

Im folgenden soll eine Reihe von Büchern besprochen werden, die mit unterschiedlichen Akzenten verschiedene Aspekte der zambischen Wirtschaft behandeln. Diese Thematik ist erst in letzter Zeit wieder aktuell geworden, nachdem die Rohstoffkonferenz in New York nicht den von den Exportländern erhofften Erfolg gehabt hat. Die zambischen Staatsfinanzen, die zu zwei Dritteln vom Kupferexport abhängen, werden daher wie bisher den Wechselfällen der Konjunkturen der entwickelten Nationen ausgesetzt sein. Dieser existenziellen Abhängigkeit aller vorwiegend nur Rohstoffe produzierender Länder von den weiterverarbeitenden Volkswirtschaften hat Zambia 1969 dadurch zu begegnen versucht, daß die INDECO, eine staatliche Holding, vom Anlagevermögen der größten privaten Kupfergesellschaften 51 Prozent zum Buchwert übernahm. Dabei ist zu berücksichtigen, daß die ausländischen Gesellschaften De Beers, Rand Selection, Anglo-American, Selection Trust und AMAX zusammen fast 80 Prozent des zambischen Kupfermarktes beherrschten.

¹⁸ See Edgar Tomson, *Das Staatsangehörigkeitsrecht der ostasiatischen Staaten* (Frankfurt, Berlin: Alfred Metzger, 1971), pp. 81—89 and note 13 (above).